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Sustainabnility of Product Market Collusion under Credit Market Imperfections

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  • Sugata Marjit
  • Arijit Mukherjee
  • Lei Yang

Abstract

We study the implications of credit constraints for the sustainability of product market collusion in a bank-financed oligopoly in which firms face an imperfect credit market. We consider two situations, without and with credit rationing, i.e., with a binding credit limit. When there is credit rationing, a moderately higher cost of external financing may affect the degree of collusion, but a substantial increase keeps it unaffected relative to the no-constraint case. A permanent adverse demand shock in this setup does not affect the possibility of collusion, but may aggravate financing constraints and eventually lead to collusion. We consider both Cournot and Bertrand models, and the results are qualitatively the same.

Suggested Citation

  • Sugata Marjit & Arijit Mukherjee & Lei Yang, 2016. "Sustainabnility of Product Market Collusion under Credit Market Imperfections," CESifo Working Paper Series 6292, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6292
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mausumi Kar, 2018. "Economic Integration And Trade Protection: Policy Issues For South Asian Countries," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(1), pages 167-182, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    collusion; credit market; debt-equity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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