Property Rights, Optimal Public Enforcement, and Growth
AbstractWe study the link between public enforcement of property rights, innovation investments, and economic growth in an endogenous growth framework with an expanding set of product varieties. We find that a government may assure positive equilibrium growth through public employment in the enforcement of property rights, if the economic environment is sufficiently favorable to growth and/or public enforcement is sufficiently effective. However, in terms of welfare an equilibrium path without property rights protection and growth might be preferable. In this case the enforcement of property rights involves too much reallocation of labor from production and research towards the public sector.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3668.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
technological change; economic development; property rights; public employment;
Other versions of this item:
- Andreas Irmen & Johanna Kuehnel, 2011. "Property rights, optimal public enforcement, and growth," CREA Discussion Paper Series 11-18, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
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