Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Property Rights, Optimal Public Enforcement, and Growth

Contents:

Author Info

  • Andreas Irmen
  • Johanna Kuehnel

Abstract

We study the link between public enforcement of property rights, innovation investments, and economic growth in an endogenous growth framework with an expanding set of product varieties. We find that a government may assure positive equilibrium growth through public employment in the enforcement of property rights, if the economic environment is sufficiently favorable to growth and/or public enforcement is sufficiently effective. However, in terms of welfare an equilibrium path without property rights protection and growth might be preferable. In this case the enforcement of property rights involves too much reallocation of labor from production and research towards the public sector.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2011/wp-cesifo-2011-12/cesifo1_wp3668.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3668.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3668

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Email:
Web page: http://www.cesifo.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: technological change; economic development; property rights; public employment;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Paul Zak, . "Institutions, Property Rights, and Growth," Gruter Institute Working Papers on Law, Economics, and Evolutionary Biology, Berkeley Electronic Press 2-1-1009, Berkeley Electronic Press.
  2. Tornell, Aaron, 1997. " Economic Growth and Decline with Endogenous Property Rights," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 219-50, September.
  3. Bénassy, Jean-Pascal, 1996. "Is there always too little research in endogenous growth with expanding product variety ?," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9615, CEPREMAP.
  4. Gonzalez, Francisco M. & Neary, Hugh M., 2008. "Prosperity without conflict," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2170-2181, October.
  5. Eicher, Theo & García-Peñalosa, Cecilia, 2008. "Endogenous strength of intellectual property rights: Implications for economic development and growth," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 237-258, February.
  6. Oguzhan Dincer & Christopher Ellis, 2005. "Predation, Protection, and Accumulation: Endogenous Property Rights in an Overlapping Generations Growth Model," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 435-455, August.
  7. Estrin, Saul & Korosteleva, Julia & Mickiewicz, Tomasz, 2009. "Better Means More: Property Rights and High-Growth Aspiration Entrepreneurship," IZA Discussion Papers 4396, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1996. " Predation and Accumulation," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 333-50, September.
  9. Barro, Robert J, 1996. " Democracy and Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-27, March.
  10. Furukawa, Yuichi, 2007. "The protection of intellectual property rights and endogenous growth: Is stronger always better?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(11), pages 3644-3670, November.
  11. de Groot, Henri L. F. & Nahuis, Richard, 1998. "Taste for diversity and the optimality of economic growth," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 291-295, March.
  12. Ethier, Wilfred J, 1982. "National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern Theory of International Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 389-405, June.
  13. Gonzalez, Francisco M., 2007. "Effective property rights, conflict and growth," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 127-139, November.
  14. Aron, Janine, 2000. "Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, World Bank Group, vol. 15(1), pages 99-135, February.
  15. George Economides & Hyun Park & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2007. "Optimal Protection of Property Rights in a General Equilibrium Model of Growth," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(1), pages 153-175, 03.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3668. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.