A Static Model for Voting on Social Security
AbstractThis paper examines a static voting model for public pensions. The key premise is that families can internalize the cost and benefits of pay-as-you-go programs. A family realizes a net gain if its members collectively receive more in benefits in the current period than they pay in payroll taxes. Abstracting from differences in income, net benefits are positive if the family’s retiree-worker ratio exceeds the national average. If a sufficient fraction of retirees have a suitable number of working-age relatives—not too few and not too many—then a majority of voters belongs to families with above average retiree-worker ratios.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2649.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
social security; public pensions; voting model;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
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