This paper studies a problem of non linear taxation when individuals have different longevities resulting from a non-monetary effort (like exercising). We first present the laissez-faire and the first best. Like Becker and Philipson (1998), we find that the laissez-faire level of effort is too high compared with the first best, because individuals do not internalize the impact of survival on the return of their savings. We also claim that because of its non-monetary form, effort is not contractible. That is why we modify our framework and assume, for the rest of the paper, that effort is determined by the individual while the social planner only allocates consumptions. It turns out that, under full information, a tax on the return of annuitized savings is desirable for both types. This tax is higher for the low-survival individual. Under asymmetric information, the low-survival individual still faces a tax while the high-survival individual might now face a positive or negative tax on annuities. Interestingly, our results depend on the value of life.
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number
CESifo Working Paper No. 2567.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Production
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
CREMER, Helmuth & DE DONDER, Philippe & MALDONADO, Dario & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2008.
"Taxing sin goods and subsidizing health care,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2008031, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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