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A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries

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Author Info
Jan K. Brueckner ()
Harris Selod ()

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Abstract

This paper offers a new theoretical approach to urban squatting, reflecting the view that squatters and formal residents compete for land within a city. The key implication of this view is that squatters “squeeze” the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents. The squatter organizer, however, ensures that this squeezing is not too severe, since otherwise the formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction by landowners (defensive expenditures by squatter households also help to forestall eviction). Because eviction is thus absent in equilibrium, the model differs crucially from previous analytical frameworks, where eviction occurs with some probability.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 2328.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2328

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
O18 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses
R00 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - General - - - General
R31 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Production Analysis and Firm Location - - - Housing Supply and Markets

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  1. Jean O. Lanjouw & Philip I. Levy, 2002. "Untitled: A Study of Formal and Informal Property Rights in Urban Ecuador," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(482), pages 986-1019, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Hoy, Michael & Jimenez, Emmanuel, 1991. "Squatters' Rights and Urban Development: An Economic Perspective," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 58(229), pages 79-92, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Duranton, Gilles, 2008. "From Cities to Productivity and Growth in Developing Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 6634, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Jimenez, Emmanuel, 1985. "Urban squatting and community organization in developing countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 69-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Rafael Di Tella & Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2007. "The Formation of Beliefs: Evidence from the Allocation of Land Titles to Squatters," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(1), pages 209-241, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Lall, Somik V. & Lundberg, Mattias K.A. & Shalizi, Zmarak, 2008. "Implications of alternate policies on welfare of slum dwellers: Evidence from Pune, India," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 56-73, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Jimenez, Emmanuel, 1984. "Tenure Security and Urban Squatting," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 66(4), pages 556-67, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Friedman, Joseph & Jimenez, Emmanuel & Mayo, Stephen K., 1988. "The demand for tenure security in developing countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 185-198, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Zenou, Yves, 2002. "How do firms redline workers?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 391-408, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Erica Field, 2007. "Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(4), pages 1561-1602, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Galiani, Sebastian & Schargrodsky, Ernesto, 2004. "Effects of land titling on child health," Economics and Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 353-372, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Erica Field, 2005. "Property Rights and Investment in Urban Slums," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 279-290, 04/05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Zenou, Yves & Boccard, Nicolas, 2000. "Racial Discrimination and Redlining in Cities," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 260-285, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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