In this paper, we present a model of a one parent–one child household where parental decisions on labor supply, leisure, and the demand for private and public child care are simultaneously endogenized and intertemporally determined. We characterize the path of the optimal decisions and investigate the impact of various public child care fees and of the quality of public child care services on the parent’s time allocation and the child’s performance level. Our results show that different public child care policies may induce substantially diverging effects, and reveal that each policy frequently faces a trade off between an encouragement of labor supply and an enhancement of the child’s performance.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number
CESifo Working Paper No. 1819.