Concerns for Equity and the Optimal Co-Payments for Publicly Provided Health Care
AbstractIn countries where health care is publicly provided and where equity considerations play an important role in policy decisions, it is often argued that an increase in co-payments is unacceptable as it will be particularly harmful to the less well-off in society. The present paper derives socially optimal co-payments in a simple model of health care where people differ in income and in severity of illness. The social optimum depends on the welfare weights given to persons with different levels of expected utility. Increased concern for equity may increase optimal co-payments for illnesses with homogeneous severity across the population. For illnesses where the severity varies strongly across the population, optimal co-payments go down as a response to increased concern for equity, provided income differences in the society are sufficiently small.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1620.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
public health; co-payments; equity concerns;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-HEA-2005-12-20 (Health Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2005-12-20 (Public Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ching-To Albert Ma & Michael H. Riordan, 2002.
"Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(1), pages 81-107, 03.
- Ching-to Albert Ma & Michael Riordan, 1997. "Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 0080, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Shavell, Steven, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 541-62, November.
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