This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Supplier Discretion over Provision: Theory and an Application to Medical Care

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
James Malcomson ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Suppliers who are better informed than purchasers, such as physicians treating insured patients, often have discretion over what to provide. This paper shows how, when the purchaser observes what is supplied but can observe neither recipient type nor the actual cost incurred, optimal provision differs from what would be efficient if the purchaser had full information, whether or not the supplier can extract informational rent. The analysis is applied to, among other things, data on tests for coronary artery disease and to Medicare diagnosis-related groups defined by the treatment given, not just the diagnosis, illustrating the biases in provision that result.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocCIDL/cesifo1_wp1407.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo GmbH in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 1407.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1407

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Web page: http://www.cesifo.de

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Julio Saavedra).

Related research
Keywords: supplier discretion procurement public provision diagnosis-related groups medicare prospective payment cost-effectiveness

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ellis, Randall P & McGuire, Thomas G, 1993. "Supply-Side and Demand-Side Cost Sharing in Health Care," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 135-51, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Mark McClellan, 1997. "Hospital Reimbursement Incentives: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(1), pages 91-128, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M., 2002. "Cost sharing in health service provision: an empirical assessment of cost savings," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 219-249, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. James M. Malcomson, 2004. "Health Service Gatekeepers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 401-421, Summer.
    Other versions:
  5. Chalkley, M. & Malcomson, J.M., 1998. "Government Purchasing of Health Services," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9821, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    Other versions:
  6. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Siciliani, Luigi, 2006. "Selection of treatment under prospective payment systems in the hospital sector," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 479-499, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. McGuire, Thomas G., 2000. "Physician agency," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 461-536 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About five million pdf files are downloaded through RePEc every year.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-22.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.