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Should physicians team up to treat chronic diseases?

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  • Griebenow, Malte

Abstract

This paper studies referral strategy and effort provision of a primary care physician and a specialist who are responsible for the treatment of chronically ill patients who can be in a mild or severe condition. Two organizational settings are compared, a team in which physicians cooperate and solo practices in which they do not. Team care is strictly superior to solo practice care if the difference in expected treatment costs between disease severities is relatively larger for the primary care physician. Otherwise, solo practice care is weakly superior to team care under reasonable assumptions.

Suggested Citation

  • Griebenow, Malte, 2023. "Should physicians team up to treat chronic diseases?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:89:y:2023:i:c:s0167629623000176
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2023.102740
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Referral; Chronic care; PCP; Specialist; Moral hazard; Team;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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