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Pigou’s Advice and Sisyphus’ Warning: Carbon Pricing with Non-Permanent Carbon-Dioxide Removal

Author

Listed:
  • Matthias Kalkuhl
  • Max Franks
  • Friedemann Gruner
  • Kai Lessmann
  • Ottmar Edenhofer

Abstract

Carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere is becoming an important option to achieve net zero climate targets. This paper develops a welfare and public economics perspective on optimal policies for carbon removal and storage in non-permanent sinks like forests, soil, oceans, wood products or chemical products. We derive a new metric for the valuation of non-permanent carbon storage, the social cost of carbon removal (SCC-R), which embeds also the conventional social cost of carbon emissions. We show that the contribution of CDR is to create new carbon sinks that should be used to reduce transition costs, even if the stored carbon is released to the atmosphere eventually. Importantly, CDR does not raise the ambition of optimal temperature levels unless initial atmospheric carbon stocks are excessively high. For high initial atmospheric carbon stocks, CDR allows to reduce the optimal temperature below initial levels. Finally, we characterize three different policy regimes that ensure an optimal deployment of carbon removal: downstream carbon pricing, upstream carbon pricing, and carbon storage pricing. The policy regimes differ in their informational and institutional requirements regarding monitoring, liability and financing.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthias Kalkuhl & Max Franks & Friedemann Gruner & Kai Lessmann & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2022. "Pigou’s Advice and Sisyphus’ Warning: Carbon Pricing with Non-Permanent Carbon-Dioxide Removal," CESifo Working Paper Series 10169, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10169
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Derek Lemoine, 2020. "Incentivizing Negative Emissions Through Carbon Shares," NBER Working Papers 27880, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Franks, Max & Kalkuhl, Matthias & Lessmann, Kai, 2023. "Optimal pricing for carbon dioxide removal under inter-regional leakage," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
    3. White, Ben & Doole, Graeme J. & Pannell, David J. & Florec, Veronique, 2012. "Optimal environmental policy design for mine rehabilitation and pollution with a risk of non-compliance owing to firm insolvency," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 56(2), pages 1-22.
    4. William Nordhaus, 2014. "Estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon: Concepts and Results from the DICE-2013R Model and Alternative Approaches," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(1), pages 000.
    5. Farzin, Y. H., 1996. "Optimal pricing of environmental and natural resource use with stock externalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 31-57, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ottmar Edenhofer & Max Franks & Matthias Kalkuhl & Artur Runge-Metzger, 2023. "On the Governance of Carbon Dioxide Removal – A Public Economics Perspective," CESifo Working Paper Series 10370, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    carbon dioxide removal; carbon capture; social cost of carbon; climate policy; impermanence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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