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Testing Leniency Programs Experimentally: The Impact of Change in Parameterization

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  • Jana Krajcova
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    Abstract

    I analyze subjects’ sensitivity to parametric change that does not affect the theoretical prediction. I find that increasing the value of an illegal transaction to a briber and reducing the penalties to both culprits leads to more bribes being paid but does not affect the cooperation of the bribee. My data also suggest that trust and preferences towards others might play a role. My paper provides a testbed for experimental testing of anti-corruption measures and adds evidence to the on-going discussion on the need for sociodemographic controls.

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    File URL: http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp370.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague in its series CERGE-EI Working Papers with number wp370.

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    Date of creation: Oct 2008
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    Handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp370

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    Keywords: Corruption; anti-corruption mechanisms; optimal contract; monitoring.;

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    1. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    2. Ulrich Kamecke, 1997. "note: Rotations: Matching Schemes that Efficiently Preserve the Best Reply Structure of a One Shot Game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 409-417.
    3. Klaus Abbink & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2006. "Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 103-121, June.
    4. Klaus Abbink & Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke Renner, 2002. "An Experimental Bribery Game," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 428-454, October.
    5. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2001. "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1402-1422, December.
    6. Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(4), pages 559-594, December.
    7. Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1341-1378, July.
    8. Glenn W. Harrison & Eric Johnson & Melayne M. McInnes & E. Elisabet Rutstr�m, 2005. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 897-901, June.
    9. Libor Dušek & Andreas Ortman & Lubomír Lízal, 2005. "Understanding Corruption and Corruptibility Through Experiments," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2005(2), pages 147-162.
    10. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
    11. David J Cooper & John B Van Huyck, 2002. "Evidence on the Equivalence of the Stratetic and Extensive Form Representation of Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 234936000000000001, David K. Levine.
    12. Jinyoung Hwang, 2002. "A Note On The Relationship Between Corruption And Government Revenue," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 27(2), pages 161-177, December.
    13. Bigoni, Maria & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Le Coq, Chloe & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2008. "Fines, Leniency, Rewards and Organized Crime: Evidence from Antitrust Experiments," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics 698, Stockholm School of Economics.
    14. Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World," IMF Working Papers, International Monetary Fund 98/63, International Monetary Fund.
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