Soldiers or Bureaucrats?Conflict and the Military’s Role in Policy-Making
AbstractOne of the most striking institutional features of many less developed countries is that their militaries are closely involved in policy-making, potentially having a large impact on economic outcomes. This paper examines the role of the military in setting policy. For this purpose it develops one of the first models of the military, where its political involvement can take two forms: direct when the military runs the government, and indirect when it influences policy without governing directly. We focus on civilian regimes and find that war decreases the payoff to the military from both forms of involvement, but also makes staging successful coups easier. In equilibrium, an increase in the likelihood of war makes indirect involvement less likely; its impact on coups, which are aimed at establishing direct control, is non-monotonic. We show empirical evidence for this non-monotonic relationship, withcoups being least likely for low and high probabilities of war.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE in its series STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series with number 012.
Date of creation: Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/default.asp
institutions; conflict; political economy; military; war; coups;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O38 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-09-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-09-19 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DEV-2009-09-19 (Development)
- NEP-POL-2009-09-19 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Acemoglu, Daron & Ticchi, Davide & Vindigni, Andrea, 2008.
"A Theory of Military Dictatorships,"
03-10-2008a, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Ticchi, Davide & Vindigni, Andrea, 2008. "A theory of military dictatorships," POLIS Working Papers 100, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
- Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2008. "A Theory of Military Dictatorships," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 74, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Ticchi, Davide & Vindigni, Andrea, 2008. "A Theory of Military Dictatorships," IZA Discussion Papers 3392, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2008. "A Theory of Military Dictatorships," NBER Working Papers 13915, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2000.
"The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,"
NBER Working Papers
7771, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
- Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson, 1999.
"A Theory of Political Transitions,"
99-26, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2010.
"Conflict and Deterrence under Strategic Risk,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 125(4), pages 1821-1858, November.
- Timothy Besley & Masayuki Kudamatsu, 2007.
"Making Autocracy Work,"
STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers
48, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Leon, G., 2012. "Loyalty for Sale? Military Spending and Coups d'Etat," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1209, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.