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Loyalty for Sale? Military Spending and Coups d'Etat

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  • Leon, G.

Abstract

Coups d'etat continue to be common around the world, often leading to changes in leaders and institutions. We examine the relationship between military spending and coups and find that (i) successful coups increase military spending by more than failed attempts, and (ii) coups are more likely when military spending as a share of GDP is relatively low. Our identification strategy exploits the conditional independence between a coup's outcome and the change in military spending that follows it. We interpret this as evidence that the military may stage coups in order to increase its

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 1209.

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Date of creation: 27 Feb 2012
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Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:1209

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Keywords: coups; income; conflict; military spending; political economy;

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Cited by:
  1. Vincenzo Bove & Roberto Nisticò, 2014. "Coups d'état and Defense Spending: A Counterfactual Analysis," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy 366, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.

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