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The Flexible-Salary Match: A Proposal to Increase the Salary Flexibility of the National Resident Matching Program

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Author Info

  • Crawford, Vincent P.

Abstract

Most graduating medical students in the United States obtain hospital residencies through the National Resident Matching Program ("NRMP"). The NRMP, or "Match" as it is called, is a centralized procedure that begins each year with hospitals defining residency positions, including a fixed specification of the associated salaries. The Match has been criticized on the grounds that this salary inflexibility biases salaries downward and possibly interferes with efficient allocation of students to positions. This paper proposes a centralized procedure, called the "Flexible-Salary Match," which makes salaries fully flexible an may help to overcome those problems.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC San Diego in its series University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series with number qt2gw114b2.

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Date of creation: 01 Feb 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt2gw114b2

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Related research

Keywords: matching Markets; Market Design;

References

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  1. Jeremy Bulow & Jonathan Levin, 2006. "Matching and Price Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 652-668, June.
  2. Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," NBER Working Papers 6963, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Crawford, Vincent P & Knoer, Elsie Marie, 1981. "Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 437-50, March.
  4. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-72, August.
  5. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Alvin E. Roth, 2007. "What Have We Learned From Market Design?," NBER Working Papers 13530, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Ma, Jinpeng, 2010. "The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP)," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 150-164, May.

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