An Experiment on the Coreâˆ—
AbstractEach of n â‰¥ 1 identical buyers (and m â‰¥ 1 identical sellers) wants to buy (sell) a single unit of an indivisible good. The core predicts a unique and extreme outcome: the entire surplus is split evenly among the buyers when m > n and among the sellers when m
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz in its series Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number qt0jq48184.
Date of creation: 28 Mar 2008
Date of revision:
core; market; experiment; fairness;
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