A Route Choice Experiment With an Efficient Toll
AbstractTraffic congestion is a substantial time cost for many urban commuters. This paper studies the response of subjects in an experimental setting in which subjects choose between a short direct route that becomes increasingly congested as more people travel on it and a more indirect route that does not become congested. More specifically, I investigate how subjects respond to the use of a toll that theory predicts will minimize travel time costs. The experimental results reported in this paper show that this toll comes very close to achieving efficient use of the travel network.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara in its series University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series with number qt4s1116mv.
Date of creation: 01 May 2007
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congestion; Pigou-Knight-Downs paradox; experiment; toll;
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