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Short on Shots: Are Calls on Cooperative Restraint Effective in Managing the Scarcity of Flu Vaccines?

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  • de Janvry, Alain
  • Sadoulet, Elisabeth
  • Villas-Boas, Sofia B

Abstract

We conducted a randomized experiment at the time of the 2004 flu vaccine shortage, providing information about the sharply reduced number of clinics and their schedule, and an appeal on cooperative restraint to a campus population. This strategy was intended to reduce demand for vaccination among non-priority individuals and to free available supplies for the priority population. It failed to achieve its purpose. Information induced a net increase in vaccines distributed and, perversely, the net increase originated entirely in non-priority individuals. The surprising finding is that calls on cooperative restraint induced an uncalled for positive response among priority individuals, while they induced an increase in cheating among non-priority individuals. Age as a qualifying factor was in particular widely abused, with the number of “65 years old” more than twice the predicted value, while about half of the predicted 61-64 years old are missing.

Suggested Citation

  • de Janvry, Alain & Sadoulet, Elisabeth & Villas-Boas, Sofia B, 2008. "Short on Shots: Are Calls on Cooperative Restraint Effective in Managing the Scarcity of Flu Vaccines?," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt8h7125w3, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt8h7125w3
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