The Impact of Potential Labor Supply on Licensing Exam Difficulty
AbstractEntry into licensed professions requires meeting competency requirements, typ- ically assessed through licensing examinations. This paper explores whether the number of individuals attempting to enter a profession (potential supply) affects the difficulty of the entry examination. The empirical results suggest that a larger potential supply may lead to more difficult licensing exams and lower pass rates. This implies that licensing may partially shelter the market from supply shocks and limit the impact of policies targeted at increasing labor supply.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 53.
Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision: 2013
occupational licensing; minimum standards; entry regulation; legal market.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-10-27 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-LAB-2007-10-27 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2007-10-27 (Law & Economics)
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