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The Effect of State Funeral Regulations on Cremations Rates: Testing for Demand Inducement in Funeral Markets

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  • Harrington, David E
  • Krynski, Kathy J

Abstract

This article presents evidence that state funeral regulations affect the choice of whether to cremate or bury dead bodies. States that require either funeral directors to be embalmers or funeral homes to have embalming preparation rooms have lower cremation rates, holding other factors such as income, age, educational attainment, nativity, religious adherence, race, and region constant. These embalming regulations reduce cremation rates by roughly 16 percent, which increases the amount spent on funerals by 2.6 percent. The article also presents evidence that funeral directors induce consumers to choose burial over cremation, which supports one of the fundamental premises underlying the Federal Trade Commission's Funeral Rule. However, the additional evidence that inducement is more prevalent in states with stringent funeral regulations suggests that repealing state regulations that impede competition might be more effective than the Funeral Rule in attacking the problem of demand inducement. Copyright 2002 by the University of Chicago.

Suggested Citation

  • Harrington, David E & Krynski, Kathy J, 2002. "The Effect of State Funeral Regulations on Cremations Rates: Testing for Demand Inducement in Funeral Markets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 199-225, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:45:y:2002:i:1:p:199-225
    DOI: 10.1086/324652
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    Cited by:

    1. Tania Crisanto-Perrazo & Jonathan Guayasamín-Vergara & Eduardo Mayorga-Llerena & Izar Sinde-Gonzalez & Diego Vizuete-Freire & Theofilos Toulkeridis & Geomara Flores Gomez & Greta Fierro-Naranjo, 2022. "Determination of Empirical Environmental Indices for the Location of Cemeteries—An Innovative Proposal for Worldwide Use," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(10), pages 1-15, May.
    2. Canofari Paolo & Marini Giancarlo & Scaramozzino Pasquale, 2014. "To sleep, perchance to dream: Prices for burial spaces in US states," wp.comunite 0114, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
    3. Mario Pagliero & Edward Timmons, 2013. "Occupational Regulation in the European Legal Market," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 10(2), pages 243-265, August.
    4. Judith A. Chevalier & Fiona M. Scott Morton, 2008. "State Casket Sales Restrictions: A Pointless Undertaking?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(1), pages 1-23, February.
    5. Thierry Blayac & Patrice Bougette & Christian Montet, 2014. "How consumer information curtails market power in the funeral industry," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 421-437, June.
    6. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, 2013. "Lowering the Bar to Raise the Bar: Licensing Difficulty and Attorney Quality in Japan," Working Papers 2013-12, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    7. Daniel J. Smith & Noah J. Trudeau, 2019. "The Undertaker’s Cut: Challenging the Rational Basis for Casket Licensure," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 34(Summer 20), pages 23-41.
    8. Canofari, Paolo & Marini, Giancarlo & Scaramozzino, Pasquale, 2017. "The importance of being remembered: Prices for cemetery plots in the US," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 638-645.
    9. Lex, Christoph & Tennyson, Sharon, 2021. "EU intermediary regulation and its impact on insurance agent quality: Evidence from Germany," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    10. Judith Chevalier & Fiona Scott Morton, 2006. "State Casket Sales and Restrictions: A Pointless Undertaking?," NBER Working Papers 12012, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Harrington, David, 2018. "Constraining Rivals: The Effect of State-Mandated Facility Requirements on the Locations and Sizes of Funeral Homes," Working Papers 06958, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    12. Alison Cathles & David E. Harrington & Kathy Krynski, 2010. "The Gender Gap in Funeral Directors: Burying Women with Ready‐to‐Embalm Laws?," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 48(4), pages 688-705, December.
    13. Turkhan Sadigov, 2021. "Death beyond the means: Funeral overspending and its government regulation around the world," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(3), pages 363-398, August.
    14. Pagliero, Mario, 2013. "The impact of potential labor supply on licensing exam difficulty," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 141-152.
    15. Chiara Farronato & Andrey Fradkin & Bradley Larsen & Erik Brynjolfsson, 2020. "Consumer Protection in an Online World: An Analysis of Occupational Licensing," NBER Working Papers 26601, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Pizzola, Brandon & Tabarrok, Alexander, 2017. "Occupational licensing causes a wage premium: Evidence from a natural experiment in Colorado’s funeral services industry," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 50-59.
    17. Lori Parcel, 2008. "Stiff Competition: Vertical Relationships in Cremation Services," Discussion Papers 07-041, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    18. Jerry Ellig, 2015. "State funeral regulations: inside the black box," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 97-123, August.
    19. David E. Harrington & Jaret Treber, 2020. "Constraining Competition With State Mandated Facility Requirements," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(4), pages 659-674, October.
    20. Pagliero, Mario, 2011. "What is the objective of professional licensing? Evidence from the US market for lawyers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 473-483, July.
    21. Lefgren Lars & McIntyre Frank L & Miller Michelle, 2010. "Chapter 7 or 13: Are Client or Lawyer Interests Paramount?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-46, September.
    22. Paolo Canofari & Giancarlo Marini & Pasquale Scaramozzino, 2013. "To Sleep, Perchance to Dream: Prices for Funeral Homes in US States," CEIS Research Paper 260, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 11 Jan 2013.

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