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Pricing in Day-Ahead Electricity Markets with Near-Optimal Unit Commitment

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Listed:
  • Eldridge, B.
  • O’Neill, R.
  • Hobbs, B.

Abstract

This paper revisits some peculiar pricing properties of near-optimal unit commitment solutions. Previous work has found that prices can behave erratically even as unit commitment solutions approach the optimal solution, resulting in potentially large wealth transfers due to suboptimality of the solution. Our analysis considers how recently proposed pricing models affect this behavior. Results demonstrate a previously unknown property of one of these pricing models, called approximate Convex Hull Pricing (aCHP), that eliminates erratic price behavior, and therefore limits wealth transfers with respect to the optimal unit commitment solution. The absence of wealth transfers may imply fewer strategic bidding incentives, which could enhance market efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Eldridge, B. & O’Neill, R. & Hobbs, B., 2018. "Pricing in Day-Ahead Electricity Markets with Near-Optimal Unit Commitment," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1872, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:1872
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unit commitment; nonconvex pricing; mixed integer programming; market design;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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