‘Incentive Aspects of Revenue Sharing: Central and Regional Government in Russia’
AbstractThe paper provides an empirical analysis of fiscal incentives for Russian regional governments to foster economic growth and development. It points out several serious problems with previous empirical studies of fiscal incentives into Russian federalism, develops a new theoretical framework for the analysis of revenue-sharing policy between central and regional governments, paying particular attention to the case of non-benevolent authorities, and provides new estimates of incentive effects using an improved econometric methodology and a newly-collected dataset. Contrary to existing studies, incentives for regional governments are estimated to be present, but these incentive effects are considerably weaker in the short run than in the long run.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0440.
Date of creation: Jul 2004
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Fiscal federalism; incentives; Russia; regional government;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
- O52 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Europe
- P35 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Public Finance
- R5 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2004-07-26 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2004-09-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CIS-2004-09-30 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-GEO-2004-09-30 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-PBE-2004-07-26 (Public Economics)
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