Bureaucrats in Parliament: Theory and Evidence on its Determinants in Germany
AbstractThis paper addresses the personal linkages between the public administration and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the strong representation of bureaucrats in many Western parliaments compromises the constitutionally proposed political neutrality of the public service and generates a con ict of interest. We present a cost-bene t calculus and analyze speci c legal provisions for the German Laender to understand the selection of public servants into parliaments. Based on a novel data set, we nd that incompatibility rules decrease and abeyance compensation increases the fraction of public servants in Laender parliaments.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel in its series Working papers with number 2008/06.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Political selection; parliamentary election; public servants; incompatibility;
Other versions of this item:
- Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2008. "Bureaucrats in Parliament: Theory and Evidence on Its Determinants in Germany," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-23, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
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