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Behavioral Implementation

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Abstract

Implementation theory assumes that participants’ choices are rational,in the sense of being derived from the maximization of a contextindependent preference. The paper investigates implementation under complete information when the mechanism designer is aware that individuals suffer from cognitive biases that lead to violations of IIA, or cannot exclude the possibility of such “irrational” behavior.

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File URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2012/2012-6_paper.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2012-6.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2012-6

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Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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References

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  1. Eliaz, K., 1999. "Fault Tolerant Implementation," Papers, Tel Aviv 21-99, Tel Aviv.
  2. Aizerman, M. A. & Aleskerov, F. T., 1986. "Voting operators in the space of choice functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 201-242, June.
  3. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
  4. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, 2007. "Beyond Revealed Preference Choice Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics," Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research 07-031, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  5. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1990. "Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 453-75, July.
  6. Emre Ozdenoren & Stephen Salant & Dan Silverman, 2006. "Willpower and the Optimal Control of Visceral Urges," NBER Working Papers 12278, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
  8. Ville Korpela, 2012. "Implementation without rationality assumptions," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 189-203, February.
  9. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
  10. Gil Kalai & Ariel Rubinstein & Ran Spiegler, 2001. "Rationalizing Choice Functions by Multiple Rationales," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp278, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  11. De Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2009. "Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7414, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Attila Ambrus & Kareen Rozen, 2008. "Rationalizing Choice with Multi-Self Models," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1670, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2012.
  13. Yusufcan Masatlioglu & Daisuke Nakajima & Erkut Ozbay, 2009. "Revealed Attention," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews, www.najecon.org 814577000000000409, www.najecon.org.
  14. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-99, September.
  15. Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2012. "Categorize Then Choose: Boundedly Rational Choice And Welfare," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 10(5), pages 1141-1165, October.
  16. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2011. "A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000258, David K. Levine.
  17. Spiegler, Ran, 2011. "Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780195398717, October.
  18. repec:reg:wpaper:320 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Masatlioglu, Yusufcan & Ok, Efe A., 2005. "Rational choice with status quo bias," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 1-29, March.
  20. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
  21. Saran, Rene, 2011. "Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1712-1720, July.
  22. Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, 2003. "Libertarian Paternalism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 175-179, May.
  23. Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2007. "Sequentially Rationalizable Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1824-1839, December.
  24. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, 2003. "Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 48(Jun).
  25. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
  26. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  27. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, 2009. "Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics-super-," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 124(1), pages 51-104, February.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Björn Bartling & Nick Netzer, 2014. "An Externality-Robust Auction: Theory and Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 4771, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Björn Bartling & Nick Netzer, 2014. "An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence," ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich 153, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  3. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2013. "Complex Questionnaires," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000644, David K. Levine.

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