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Implementation without rationality assumptions

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  • Ville Korpela

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  • Ville Korpela, 2012. "Implementation without rationality assumptions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 189-203, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:72:y:2012:i:2:p:189-203
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-011-9251-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Role of honesty in full implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March.
    2. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    3. Sen, Amartya K, 1977. "Social Choice Theory: A Re-examination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(1), pages 53-89, January.
    4. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Behavioral aspects of implementation theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 161-164, July.
    5. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    6. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, Decembrie.
    7. Yuval Salant & Ariel Rubinstein, 2008. "(A, f): Choice with Frames -super-1," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(4), pages 1287-1296.
    8. Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2007. "Sequentially Rationalizable Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1824-1839, December.
    9. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen, 1991. "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(1), pages 121-128.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Horan, Sean, 2016. "A simple model of two-stage choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 372-406.
    2. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2014. "Behavioral Implementation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(10), pages 2975-3002, October.
    3. T. Hayashi & R. Jain & V. Korpela & M. Lombardi, 2023. "Behavioral strong implementation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1257-1287, November.
    4. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2014. "Complex Questionnaires," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(4), pages 1529-1541, July.
    5. Kimya, Mert, 2017. "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 138-146.
    6. Altun, Ozan Altuğ & Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Implementation with a sympathizer," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 36-49.
    7. Mehmet Barlo & Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2022. "Computational implementation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 605-633, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Moore–Repullo set; Nash Implementation; n ≥ 2 Players; Properties α and γ ; C72; D03; D71; D78;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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