Patent Races with Dynamic Complementarity
AbstractRecent models of multi-stage R&D have shown that a system of weak intellectual property rights may lead to faster innovation by inducing firms to share intermediate technological knowledge. In this article I introduce a distinction between plain and sophisticated technological knowledge, which has not been noticed so far but plays a crucial role in determining how different appropriability rules affect the incentives to innovate. I argue that the positive effect of weak intellectual property regimes on the sharing of intermediate technological knowledge vanishes when technological knowledge is sophisticated, as is likely to be the case in many high tech industries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna in its series Working Papers with number wp733.
Date of creation: Feb 2011
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- O30 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-03-12 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2011-03-12 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2011-03-12 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-KNM-2011-03-12 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
- NEP-SBM-2011-03-12 (Small Business Management)
- NEP-TID-2011-03-12 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- James Bessen & Eric Maskin, 2006.
"Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation,"
Economics Working Papers
0025, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Nancy T. Gallini, 1992. "Patent Policy and Costly Imitation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 52-63, Spring.
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