Altruistically Unbalanced Kidney Exchange
AbstractAlthough a pilot national live-donor kidney exchange program was recently launched in the US, the kidney shortage is increasing faster than ever. A new solution paradigm is able to incorporate compatible pairs in exchange. In this paper, we consider an exchange framework that has both compatible and in- compatible pairs, and patients are indifferent over compatible pairs. Only two-way exchanges are permitted due to institutional constraints. We explore the structure of Pareto-efficient matchings in this framework. The mathematical structure of this model turns out to be quite novel. We show that under Pareto-efficient matchings, the same number of patients receive transplants, and it is possible to construct Pareto-efficient matchings that match the same incompatible pairs while matching the least number of compatible pairs. We extend the celebrated Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition in the combinatorial optimization literature to our new framework. We also conduct comparative static exercises on how this decomposition changes as new compatible pairs join the pool.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Boston College Department of Economics in its series Boston College Working Papers in Economics with number 781.
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2011
Date of revision: 30 Jun 2013
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Avenue, Chestnut Hill MA 02467 USA
Web page: http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC/
More information through EDIRC
Kidney Exchange; Market Design; Matching;
Other versions of this item:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-10-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2011-10-15 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HEA-2011-10-15 (Health Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Tayfun Sönmez & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2007.
"Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 828-851, June.
- Ãœnver, M. Utku & SÃ¶nmez, Tayfun & Roth, Alvin, 2007. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences," Scholarly Articles 2562809, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Moulin, Herve & Bogomolnaia, Anna, 2001.
"Random Matching under Dichotomous Preferences,"
2001-03, Rice University, Department of Economics.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005.
"Pairwise kidney exchange,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 151-188, December.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Game Theory and Information 0408001, EconWPA, revised 16 Feb 2005.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 620, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," NBER Working Papers 10698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000350, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 119(2), pages 457-488, May.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2003. "Kidney Exchange," NBER Working Papers 10002, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Roth, Alvin & Ãœnver, M. Utku & SÃ¶nmez, Tayfun, 2004. "Kidney Exchange," Scholarly Articles 2580565, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2003. "Kidney Exchange," Game Theory and Information 0308002, EconWPA.
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun S�nmez, 2005.
"A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 376-380, May.
- Nicoló, Antonio & Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo, 2012. "Transplant quality and patientsʼ preferences in paired kidney exchange," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 299-310.
- Antonio Nicolò & Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2013. "Age based preferences in paired kidney exchange," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 2013-38, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Ashlagi, Itai, 0. "Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
- Itai Ashlagi & David Gamarnik & Michael A. Rees & Alvin E. Roth, 2012. "The Need for (long) Chains in Kidney Exchange," NBER Working Papers 18202, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.