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Is Specialization Desirable in Committee Decision Making?

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  • Ruth Ben-Yashar

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University)

  • Winston Koh

    ()
    (Singapore Management University)

  • Shmuel Nitzan

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University)

Abstract

Committee decision making is examined in this study focusing on the role assigned to the committee members. In particular, we are concerned about the comparison between committee performance under specialization and non-specialization of the decision makers.

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File URL: http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/ec/wp/2009-16.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University in its series Working Papers with number 2009-16.

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Date of creation: Jun 2009
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Handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2009-16

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Postal: Faculty of Social Sciences, Bar Ilan University 52900 Ramat-Gan
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Web page: http://econ.biu.ac.il
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Keywords: framing; project selection; public policy; collective decision making; committee; uncertain dichotomous choice; specialization; simple majority rule;

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  1. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Jacob Paroush, 2000. "A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 189-199.
  2. Nitzan, Shmuel & Paroush, Jacob, 1982. "Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(2), pages 289-97, June.
  3. Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1984. "The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies," NBER Working Papers 1334, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Sah, Raaj Kumar & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1988. "Committees, Hierarchies and Polyarchies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 451-70, June.
  5. Daniel Berend & Luba Sapir, 2005. "Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 83-92, 08.
  6. Luba Sapir, 2004. "Comparison of the Polar Decision Rules for Various Types of Distributions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 325-343, 05.
  7. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Sarit Kraus, 2002. "Optimal collective dichotomous choice under quota constraints," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 839-852.
  8. Sah, R.K., 1991. "Fallibility In Human Organizations And Political Systems," Papers 625, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  9. Winston Koh, 2005. "Optimal sequential decision architectures and the robustness of hierarchies and polyarchies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 397-411, 06.
  10. Koh, Winston T. H., 1994. "Making decisions in committees a human fallibility approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 195-214, March.
  11. Koh Winston T. H., 1992. "Variable evaluation costs and the design of fallible hierarchies and polyarchies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 313-318, March.
  12. Ben-Yashar, Ruth C & Nitzan, Shmuel I, 1997. "The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 175-86, February.
  13. Daniel Berend & Luba Sapir, 2007. "Monotonicity in Condorcet’s Jury Theorem with dependent voters," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 507-528, April.
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