Is Specialization Desirable in Committee Decision Making?
AbstractCommittee decision making is examined in this study focusing on the role assigned to the committee members. In particular, we are concerned about the comparison between committee performance under specialization and non-specialization of the decision makers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University in its series Working Papers with number 2009-16.
Date of creation: Jun 2009
Date of revision:
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Postal: Faculty of Social Sciences, Bar Ilan University 52900 Ramat-Gan
Phone: Phone: +972-3-5318345
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framing; project selection; public policy; collective decision making; committee; uncertain dichotomous choice; specialization; simple majority rule;
Other versions of this item:
- Ruth Ben-Yashar & Winston Koh & Shmuel Nitzan, 2012. "Is specialization desirable in committee decision making?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(3), pages 341-357, March.
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2010-03-06 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CDM-2010-03-06 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PPM-2010-03-06 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
- NEP-SEA-2010-03-06 (South East Asia)
- NEP-UPT-2010-03-06 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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