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The Unanimity Rule and Extremely Asymmetric Committees

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  • Ruth Ban-Yashar
  • Leif Danziger

Abstract

This paper analyzes how to allocate experts into committees that use the unanimity rule to make decisions. We show that an optimal allocation of experts is extremely asymmetric. To reach the optimal allocation, therefore, one needs only to rank the experts in terms of their abilities and then allocate adjacent experts such that an expert's ability tends to vary inversely with the size of his committee. In the special case of three-member committees, we show that the optimal allocation maximizes the sum of the products of the experts' skills in each committee.

Suggested Citation

  • Ruth Ban-Yashar & Leif Danziger, 2016. "The Unanimity Rule and Extremely Asymmetric Committees," CESifo Working Paper Series 5859, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5859
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. S. Nageeb Ali & Jacob K. Goeree & Navin Kartik & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2008. "Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 181-186, May.
    2. Bozbay, İrem & Dietrich, Franz & Peters, Hans, 2014. "Judgment aggregation in search for the truth," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 571-590.
    3. Ben-Yashar, Ruth C & Nitzan, Shmuel I, 1997. "The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 175-186, February.
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    5. Ben-Yashar, Ruth & Danziger, Leif, 2011. "Symmetric and asymmetric committees," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 440-447.
    6. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Shmuel Nitzan, 2001. "The robustness of optimal organizational architectures: A note on hierarchies and polyarchies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 155-163.
    7. Sah, Raaj Kumar & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1986. "The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 716-727, September.
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    9. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2008. "Judgment aggregation without full rationality," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 15-39, June.
    10. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Leif Danziger, 2014. "On the optimal composition of committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 973-980, December.
    11. Daniel Berend & Luba Sapir, 2007. "Monotonicity in Condorcet’s Jury Theorem with dependent voters," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(3), pages 507-528, April.
    12. Peyton Young, 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 51-64, Winter.
    13. A. Georges L. Romme, 2004. "Unanimity Rule and Organizational Decision Making: A Simulation Model," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 15(6), pages 704-718, December.
    14. Baharad, Eyal & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2002. "Ameliorating Majority Decisiveness through Expression of Preference Intensity," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 96(4), pages 745-754, December.
    15. Austen-Smith, David & Feddersen, Timothy J., 2006. "Deliberation, Preference Uncertainty, and Voting Rules," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(2), pages 209-217, May.
    16. Sah, Raaj Kumar & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1988. "Committees, Hierarchies and Polyarchies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 451-470, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. BAHARAD, Eyal & BEN-YASHAR, Ruth & NITZAN, Shmuel, 2018. "Variable Competence and Collective Performance: Unanimity vs. Simple Majority Rule," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-80, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    2. Timilsina, Raja R. & Kotani, Koji & Nakagawa, Yoshinori & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 2022. "Intragenerational deliberation and intergenerational sustainability dilemma," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    3. Steve Alpern & Bo Chen, 2020. "Optimizing Voting Order on Sequential Juries: A Median Voter Theorem and Beyond," Papers 2006.14045, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2021.
    4. BEN-YASHAR, Ruth & NITZAN, Shmuel, 2017. "A Note on the Possible Advantage of Size Flexibility in Committees," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-61, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    5. Raja Timilsina & Koji Kotani & Yoshinori Nakagawa & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2018. "Does deliberation change individual opinions and hence resolve the intergenerational sustainability dilemma in societies?," Working Papers SDES-2018-7, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Oct 2018.
    6. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Miriam Krausz & Shmuel Nitzan, 2018. "The effect of democratic decision-making on investment in reputation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 155-164, October.
    7. Eyal Baharad & Ruth Ben-Yashar & Shmuel Nitzan, 2020. "Variable Competence and Collective Performance: Unanimity Versus Simple Majority Rule," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 157-167, February.
    8. Steve Alpern & Bo Chen, 2022. "Optimizing voting order on sequential juries: a median voter theorem and beyond," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(3), pages 527-565, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    unanimity rule; extremely asymmetric committees; optimal composition of committees;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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