Coordination and Cheap Talk in a Battle of the Sexes
AbstractWe consider a Battle of the Sexes game with incomplete information and allow cheap talk regarding players' private information before the game is played. We prove that the unique fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium has a desirable coordination property. Such coordination can also be obtained as a partially revealing cheap talk equilibrium. These outcomes can also be achieved using corresponding incentive compatible mechanisms, however, for different ranges of the prior probability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 13-01.
Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Battle of the Sexes; Private Information; Cheap Talk; Coordination; Mechanism;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-02-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-02-03 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2013-02-03 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-02-03 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- In-Uck Park, 2002. "Cheap-Talk Coordination of Entry by Privately Informed Firms," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(3), pages 377-393, Autumn.
- Antonio Cabrales & Walter Garcia Fontes & Massimo Motta, 1997.
"Risk dominance selects the leader. An experimental analysis,"
Economics Working Papers
222, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Garcia-Fontes, Walter & Motta, Massimo, 2000. "Risk dominance selects the leader: An experimental analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 137-162, January.
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