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A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

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  • Jesus Marin-Solano
  • Jorge Navas

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

Abstract

In Navas and Mar n-Solano (2008) the coincidence between Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for a modified version of the differential game model first proposed by Lancaster (1973) was proved. However, important restrictions on the value of the parameters of the model were included, in order to obtain an interior solution. In this paper we extend the previous result, in the limit when the discount rate is equal to zero, by eliminating the restrictions and taking into account corner solutions.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 214.

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Length: 0 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bar:bedcje:2009214

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Postal: Espai de Recerca en Economia, Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques. Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, Num 1-11 08034 Barcelona. Spain.
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  1. Pohjola, Matti, 1983. "Nash and stackelberg solutions in a differential game model of capitalism," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 173-186, September.
  2. de Zeeuw, Aart, 1992. "Note on 'Nash and Stackelberg solutions in a differential game model of capitalism'," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 139-145, January.
  3. Zeeuw, A.J. de, 1992. "Note on Nash and Stackelberg solutions in a differential game model of capitalism," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-377517, Tilburg University.
  4. Gradus, R.H.J.M., 1988. "A differential game between government and firms: A non-cooperative approach," Research Memorandum 303, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  5. Lancaster, Kelvin, 1973. "The Dynamic Inefficiency of Capitalism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(5), pages 1092-1109, Sept.-Oct.
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