Sub-national Revenue Mobilization in Peru
AbstractThis paper analyses the problem of sub-national revenue mobilization in Peru and proposes several policy reforms to improve collection performance while maintaining a sound revenue structure. We analyze the current revenues of regional and municipal governments and identify the main priorities of reform. Among the most important problems are the acute inequalities and inefficiencies associated with the revenue sharing from extractive industries. These revenues represent a significant share of sub-national budgets and currently they are distributed without consideration of the relative expenditure needs or fiscal capacity of sub-national units. In order to address this problem we propose the incorporation of a measure of fiscal capacity in the formula of the FONCOMUN, the municipal equalization transfer program. Other reforms explored include the reassignment of revenue sources between municipal provincial and district governments and the assignment of new taxes to regional governments.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University in its series International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU with number paper1209.
Length: 95 pages
Date of creation: 02 Feb 2012
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/index.html
revenue mobilization; fiscal decentralization; Peru;
Other versions of this item:
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
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- Roy Bahl & Musharraf Cyan, 2011.
"Tax assignment: does the practice match the theory?,"
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy,
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- Roy Bahl & Musharraf Cyan, 2010. "Tax Assignment: Does the Practice Match the Theory?," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1004, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- Baja Daza, Gover & Villarroel Böhrt, Sergio & Zavaleta Castellón, David, 2012.
"Diseño institucional e incentivos implicitos en la descentralización Boliviana (1994-2008)
[Institutional design and implicit incentives in Bolivia's decentralization model (1994-2008)]," MPRA Paper 48598, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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