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Unanimity under Ambiguity

Author

Listed:
  • Simona Fabrizi

    (Department of Economics, University of Auckland, New Zealand)

  • Steffen Lippert

    (Department of Economics, University of Auckland, New Zealand)

  • Addison Pan

    (Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, P. R. China)

  • Matthew Ryan

    (School of Economics, Faculty of Business, Economics and Law, AUT University)

Abstract

Ellis (2016) introduced a variant of the classic (jury) voting game in which voters have ambiguous prior beliefs. He focussed on voting under majority rule and the implications of ambiguity for Condorcet’s Theorem. Ryan (2021) studied Ellis’s game when voting takes place under the unanimity rule. His focus was on the implications of ambiguity for the “jury paradox” (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998). Neither paper described all equilibria of these games, though both authors identified equilibria with a very different structure to those in the respective games without ambiguity. We complete the description of all equilibria of voting games under the unanimity rule. In particular, we identify equilibria having the same form as those in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), as well as equilibria with a “dual” form.

Suggested Citation

  • Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert & Addison Pan & Matthew Ryan, 2021. "Unanimity under Ambiguity," Working Papers 2021-07, Auckland University of Technology, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:aut:wpaper:202107
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Guarnaschelli, Serena & McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2000. "An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 407-423, June.
    2. Feddersen, Timothy & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1998. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(1), pages 23-35, March.
    3. Addison Pan, 2019. "A Note on Pivotality," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-8, June.
    4. Coughlan, Peter J., 2000. "In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 375-393, June.
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    6. Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt & Katri K. Sieberg & Allison L. Oldham, 2015. "An Experimental Study of Jury Voting Behavior," Studies in Political Economy, in: Norman Schofield & Gonzalo Caballero (ed.), The Political Economy of Governance, edition 127, pages 157-178, Springer.
    7. Young, H. P., 1988. "Condorcet's Theory of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(4), pages 1231-1244, December.
    8. Jacob K. Goeree & Leeat Yariv, 2011. "An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(3), pages 893-921, May.
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    10. ,, 2016. "Condorcet meets Ellsberg," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), September.
    11. Matthew Ryan, 2021. "Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 543-577, May.
    12. McLennan, Andrew, 1998. "Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(2), pages 413-418, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert & Addison Pan & Matthew Ryan, 2022. "A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 399-425, October.
    2. Matthew Ryan, 2019. "Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg," Working Papers 2019-07, Auckland University of Technology, Department of Economics.
    3. Matthew Ryan, 2021. "Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 543-577, May.

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