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Strategic Export Subsidies and Reciprocal Trade Agreements: The Natural Monopoly Case

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Author Info
Bagwell, K.
Staiger, R.W.

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Abstract

why do governments seek restrictions on the use of export subsidies through reciprocal trade agreements such as GATT? With existing arguments, it is possible to understand GATT's restrictions on export subsidies as representing an inefficient victory of the interests of exporting governments over the interests of importing governments. However, to our knowledge, there does not exist a formal theoretical treatment that provides circumstances under which GATT's restrictions on export subsidies can be given a world-wide efficiency rational. In this paper, we offer one such treatment in the context of a natural monopoly market

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems in its series Working papers with number 9605.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:9605

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON, SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE(S.S.R.I.), MADISON WISCONSIN 53706 U.S.A.

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Related research
Keywords: INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS MONOPOLIES COMPETITION

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Country and Industry Studies of Trade

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Spencer, Barbara J & Brander, James A, 1983. "International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(4), pages 707-22, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1996. "Reciprocal Trade Liberalization," NBER Working Papers 5488, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Bagwell, K. & Ramey, G., 1992. "Coordination Economies, advertising and Search Behavior in Retail Markets," Papers e-92-1, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
    Other versions:
  5. Varian, Hal R, 1980. "A Model of Sales," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 651-59, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Eaton, Jonathan & Grossman, Gene M, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1992. "The Sensitivity of Strategic and Corrective R&D Policy in Battles for Monopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(4), pages 795-816, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. repec:att:wimass:19962 is not listed on IDEAS
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Mueller, Wieland, 2000. "Merger in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2000. "Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries and Agricultural Trade Disputes," NBER Working Papers 7822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Uwe Dulleck, 2004. "WTO´s Anti-dumping Rule and the Protection of Incumbents," Vienna Economics Papers 0407, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. David Collie, 2000. "A Rationale for the WTO Prohibition of Export Subsidies: Strategic Export Subsidies and World Welfare," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 229-245, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004. "Subsidy Agreements," NBER Working Papers 10292, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., 2004. "Market Reactions to Export Subsidies," NBER Working Papers 10233, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Conconi, P., 2000. "Trade Bloc Formation Under Imperfect Competition," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 571, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. repec:att:wimass:192041 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1997. "Reciprocity, Non-discrimination and Preferential Agreements in the Multilateral Trading System," NBER Working Papers 5932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. repec:att:wimass:1920011 is not listed on IDEAS
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