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Strategic Export Subsidies and Reciprocal Trade Agreements: The Natural Monopoly Case

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Author Info

  • Bagwell, K.
  • Staiger, R.W.

Abstract

why do governments seek restrictions on the use of export subsidies through reciprocal trade agreements such as GATT? With existing arguments, it is possible to understand GATT's restrictions on export subsidies as representing an inefficient victory of the interests of exporting governments over the interests of importing governments. However, to our knowledge, there does not exist a formal theoretical treatment that provides circumstances under which GATT's restrictions on export subsidies can be given a world-wide efficiency rational. In this paper, we offer one such treatment in the context of a natural monopoly market

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems in its series Working papers with number 9605.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:9605

Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON, SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE(S.S.R.I.), MADISON WISCONSIN 53706 U.S.A.

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Keywords: INTERNATIONAL TRADE; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS; MONOPOLIES; COMPETITION;

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1989. "The Sensitivity of Strategic and Corrective R&D Policy in Battles for Monopoly," Discussion Papers 868, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Eaton, Jonathan & Grossman, Gene M, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406, May.
  3. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. repec:fth:stanho:e-92-1 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Spencer, Barbara J & Brander, James A, 1983. "International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 707-22, October.
  6. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1996. "Reciprocal Trade Liberalization," NBER Working Papers 5488, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Dixit, Avinash K & Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "The Use of Protection and Subsidies for Entry Promotion and Deterrence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 139-52, March.
  8. Bagwell, Kyle & Ramey, Garey, 1994. "Coordination Economies, Advertising, and Search Behavior in Retail Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 498-517, June.
  9. Varian, Hal R, 1980. "A Model of Sales," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 651-59, September.
  10. Maggi, Giovanni, 1996. "Strategic Trade Policies with Endogenous Mode of Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 237-58, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Jost, Peter-J., 2011. "Joint ventures in patent contests with spillovers and the role of strategic budgeting," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 63(6), pages 605-637.
  2. Konrad, Kai A., 2000. "Trade contests," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 317-334, August.
  3. Steffen Huck & Kai A. Konrad & Wieland Müller, 2000. "Merger in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 241, CESifo Group Munich.
    • Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Müller, Wieland, 2000. "Merger in contests," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2000,3, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  4. Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., 2004. "Market Reactions to Export Subsidies," NBER Working Papers 10233, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2001. "Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries and Agricultural Trade Disputes," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 113-128, 07.
  6. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 2001. "Reciprocity, non-discrimination and preferential agreements in the multilateral trading system," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 281-325, June.
  7. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004. "Subsidy Agreements," NBER Working Papers 10292, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Conconi, P., 2000. "Trade Bloc Formation Under Imperfect Competition," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 571, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  9. Uwe Dulleck, 2004. "WTO´s Anti-dumping Rule and the Protection of Incumbents," Vienna Economics Papers 0407, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  10. David Collie, 2000. "A Rationale for the WTO Prohibition of Export Subsidies: Strategic Export Subsidies and World Welfare," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 229-245, July.

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