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Affirmative Action in India: Restricted Strategy Space, Complex Constraints, and Direct Mechanism Design

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  • Orhan Aygun
  • Bertan Turhan

Abstract

Since 1950, India has instituted an intricate affirmative action program through a meticulously designed reservation system. This system incorporates vertical and horizontal reservations to address historically marginalized groups' socioeconomic imbalances. Vertical reservations designate specific quotas of available positions in publicly funded educational institutions and government employment for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, and Economically Weaker Sections. Concurrently, horizontal reservations are employed within each vertical category to allocate positions for additional subgroups, such as women and individuals with disabilities. In educational admissions, the legal framework recommended that unfilled positions reserved for the OBC category revert to unreserved status. Moreover, we document that individuals from vertically reserved categories have more complicated preferences over institution-vertical category position pairs, even though authorities only elicit their preferences over institutions. To address these challenges, the present paper proposes a novel class of choice rules, termed the Generalized Lexicographic (GL) choice rules. This class is comprehensive, subsuming the most salient priority structures discussed in the extant matching literature. Utilizing the GL choice rules and the deferred acceptance mechanism, we present a robust framework that generates equitable and effective solutions for resource allocation problems in the Indian context.

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  • Orhan Aygun & Bertan Turhan, 2023. "Affirmative Action in India: Restricted Strategy Space, Complex Constraints, and Direct Mechanism Design," Papers 2310.02660, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2310.02660
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alexander Westkamp, 2013. "An analysis of the German university admissions system," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(3), pages 561-589, August.
    2. Orhan Aygün & Inácio Bó, 2021. "College Admission with Multidimensional Privileges: The Brazilian Affirmative Action Case," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 1-28, August.
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