IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2305.05516.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

GPT in Game Theory Experiments

Author

Listed:
  • Fulin Guo

Abstract

This paper explores the use of Generative Pre-trained Transformers (GPT) in strategic game experiments, specifically the ultimatum game and the prisoner's dilemma. I designed prompts and architectures to enable GPT to understand the game rules and to generate both its choices and the reasoning behind decisions. The key findings show that GPT exhibits behaviours similar to human responses, such as making positive offers and rejecting unfair ones in the ultimatum game, along with conditional cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma. The study explores how prompting GPT with traits of fairness concern or selfishness influences its decisions. Notably, the "fair" GPT in the ultimatum game tends to make higher offers and reject offers more frequently compared to the "selfish" GPT. In the prisoner's dilemma, high cooperation rates are maintained only when both GPT players are "fair". The reasoning statements GPT produces during gameplay reveal the underlying logic of certain intriguing patterns observed in the games. Overall, this research shows the potential of GPT as a valuable tool in social science research, especially in experimental studies and social simulations.

Suggested Citation

  • Fulin Guo, 2023. "GPT in Game Theory Experiments," Papers 2305.05516, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2305.05516
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2305.05516
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John J. Horton, 2023. "Large Language Models as Simulated Economic Agents: What Can We Learn from Homo Silicus?," NBER Working Papers 31122, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Selten, Reinhard & Stoecker, Rolf, 1986. "End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-70, March.
    3. Joseph Henrich, 2000. "Does Culture Matter in Economic Behavior? Ultimatum Game Bargaining among the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 973-979, September.
    4. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    5. Farmer, J. Doyne & Axtell, Robert L., 2022. "Agent-Based Modeling in Economics and Finance: Past, Present, and Future," INET Oxford Working Papers 2022-10, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.
    6. Thaler, Richard H, 1988. "The Ultimatum Game," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 195-206, Fall.
    7. Joseph Henrich, 2000. "Does culture matter in economic behavior? Ultimatum game bargaining among the machiguenga," Artefactual Field Experiments 00067, The Field Experiments Website.
    8. Cooper, Russell & DeJong, Douglas V. & Forsythe, Robert & Ross, Thomas W., 1996. "Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 187-218, February.
    9. Hessel Oosterbeek & Randolph Sloof & Gijs van de Kuilen, 2004. "Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 7(2), pages 171-188, June.
    10. Matthew Embrey & Guillaume R Fréchette & Sevgi Yuksel, 2018. "Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(1), pages 509-551.
    11. Andreoni, James A & Miller, John H, 1993. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(418), pages 570-585, May.
    12. David Cooper & E. Dutcher, 2011. "The dynamics of responder behavior in ultimatum games: a meta-study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(4), pages 519-546, November.
    13. Binmore, K & Shaked, A & Sutton, J, 1985. "Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1178-1180, December.
    14. John J. Horton, 2023. "Large Language Models as Simulated Economic Agents: What Can We Learn from Homo Silicus?," Papers 2301.07543, arXiv.org.
    15. Tilman Slembeck, 1999. "Reputations and Fairness in Bargaining - Experimental Evidence from a Repeated Ultimatum Game With Fixed Opponents," Experimental 9905002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Philip Brookins & Jason DeBacker, 2024. "Playing games with GPT: What can we learn about a large language model from canonical strategic games?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 44(1), pages 25-37.
    2. Bauer, Kevin & Liebich, Lena & Hinz, Oliver & Kosfeld, Michael, 2023. "Decoding GPT's hidden "rationality" of cooperation," SAFE Working Paper Series 401, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    3. Nunzio Lor`e & Babak Heydari, 2023. "Strategic Behavior of Large Language Models: Game Structure vs. Contextual Framing," Papers 2309.05898, arXiv.org.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2014. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 396-409.
    2. Gagen, Michael, 2013. "Isomorphic Strategy Spaces in Game Theory," MPRA Paper 46176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Ramón Cobo-Reyes & Natalia Jiménez, 2012. "The dark side of friendship: ‘envy’," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(4), pages 547-570, December.
    4. Cochard, François & Le Gallo, Julie & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Tisserand, Jean-Christian, 2021. "Social preferences across different populations: Meta-analyses on the ultimatum game and dictator game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    5. Emin Karagözoğlu & Ümit Barış Urhan, 2017. "The Effect of Stake Size in Experimental Bargaining and Distribution Games: A Survey," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 285-325, March.
    6. Bahry, Donna L. & Wilson, Rick K., 2006. "Confusion or fairness in the field? Rejections in the ultimatum game under the strategy method," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 37-54, May.
    7. van Damme, Eric & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Roth, Alvin E. & Samuelson, Larry & Winter, Eyal & Bolton, Gary E. & Ockenfels, Axel & Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Gneezy, Uri & Kocher, Martin G, 2014. "How Werner Güth's ultimatum game shaped our understanding of social behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 292-318.
    8. Hasan, Hamid & Ejaz, Nauman, 2013. "Testing for Differences across Genders: A Replication of Ultimatum Game at International Islamic University, Islamabad," MPRA Paper 44923, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Laurence Fiddick & Denise Cummins, 2001. "Reciprocity in Ranked Relationships: Does Social Structure Influence Social Reasoning?," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 149-170, May.
    10. Ernesto Reuben & Sigrid Suetens, 2018. "Instrumental Reciprocity as an Error," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-9, September.
    11. John Duffy & Felix Munoz-Garcia, 2010. "Signaling Concerns about Fairness: Cooperation under Uncertain Social Preferences," Working Papers 2010-19, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
    12. Qi, Tianxiao & Xu, Bin & Wu, Jinshan & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2022. "On the Stochasticity of Ultimatum Games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 227-254.
    13. Moreno-Garrido, Luis José Blas, 2013. "Relative Injustice Aversion," QM&ET Working Papers 13-4, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory, revised 27 Jul 2015.
    14. Alexander Lenger & Stephan Wolf & Nils Goldschmidt, 2021. "Choosing inequality: how economic security fosters competitive regimes," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 19(2), pages 315-346, June.
    15. Griffin, John & Nickerson, David & Wozniak, Abigail, 2012. "Racial differences in inequality aversion: Evidence from real world respondents in the ultimatum game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 600-617.
    16. Philipp E. Otto & Daniel Dittmer, 2019. "Simultaneous but independent ultimatum game: strategic elasticity or social motive dependency?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 61-80, March.
    17. Ralph-C Bayer, 2014. "On the Credibility of Punishment in Repeated Social Dilemma Games," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2014-08, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    18. Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2004. "Relying on a man's word?: An experimental study on non-binding contracts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 299-332, September.
    19. Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck-Hua, 2015. "Behavioral Game Theory Experiments and Modeling," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    20. Anujit Chakraborty, 2022. "Motives Behind Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Working Papers 353, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2305.05516. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.