Women'S Bargaining Power In Household Economic Decisions: Evidence From Ghana
AbstractIn this paper, the percentage of assets held by women within the household is used as a measure of women's bargaining power. The assets used in this paper include land, savings, and business assets. Using detailed household survey data from Ghana, I demonstrate that the share of assets owned by women has a significant impact on household expenditure decisions. This provides additional support for the notion that women's bargaining power can be measured, at least in some dimensions, and that women's bargaining power is an important determinant of household economic decisions. It suggests that other measures of women's bargaining power may also be useful for understanding household decisions.
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Date of creation: 1996
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