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Banking on "Green Money": Are Environmental Financial Responsibility Rules Fulfilling Their Promise?

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  • Boyd, James

Abstract

Financial responsibility rules are an increasingly common form of environmental regulation. Currently, the operators of landfills, underground petroleum storage tanks, offshore rigs, and oil tankers must demonstrate the existence of adequate levels of capital as a precondition to the legal operation of their businesses. Environmental financial responsibility ensures that firms possess the resources to compensate society for pollution costs created in the course of business operations. In addition to providing a source of funds for victim compensation and pollution remediation, financial responsibility is thought to motivate better decision-making, particularly regarding the management of long-term risks. This article describes both the promise of financial responsibility as a complement to conventional environmental regulation and a set of weaknesses associated with its current implementation under U.S. environmental statutes.

Suggested Citation

  • Boyd, James, 1996. "Banking on "Green Money": Are Environmental Financial Responsibility Rules Fulfilling Their Promise?," Discussion Papers 10592, Resources for the Future.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:rffdps:10592
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.10592
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    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/10592/files/dp960026.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Feess, Eberhard & Hege, Ulrich, 2003. "Safety monitoring, capital structure, and "financial responsibility"," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 323-339, September.
    2. Anna Alberini & David Austin, 2002. "Accidents Waiting to Happen: Liability Policy and Toxic Pollution Releases," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(4), pages 729-741, November.

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    Environmental Economics and Policy;

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