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Fishery Management Games: How to reduce effort and admit new members

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Author Info
Do, Kim Hang Pham
Folmer, Henk
Norde, Henk

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Abstract

This paper addresses the two main problems that Regional Fishery Management Organizations face. First, how to induce independent nations to reduce their fishing efforts from the competitive equilibrium to prevent the fish stock from extinction or to increase profits. We argue that adjustment from the Nash equilibrium to a state of sustainable yield can be achieved by means of the proportional rule without harming any of the countries involved. Next we propose the population monotonic allocation scheme as management rule for the second problem: the division of profits within an

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society in its series 2006 Conference, August 24-25, 2006, Nelson, New Zealand with number 31964.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:ags:nzasin:31964

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Web page: http://www.nzares.org.nz/
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Related research
Keywords: Fishery management; proportional rule; population monotonic allocation scheme; Shapley value; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C71; C72; D62; D74; Q22;

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  1. Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kaitala, Veijo & Munro, Gordon R., 1993. "The Management of High Seas Fisheries," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 8(4). [Downloadable!]
  3. Hannesson, Rognvaldur, 1997. "Fishing as a Supergame," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 309-322, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Norde, Henk & Pham Do, Kim Hang & Tijs, Stef, 2002. "Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 187-207, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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