Fishery Management Games: How to reduce effort and admit new members
AbstractThis paper addresses the two main problems that Regional Fishery Management Organizations face. First, how to induce independent nations to reduce their fishing efforts from the competitive equilibrium to prevent the fish stock from extinction or to increase profits. We argue that adjustment from the Nash equilibrium to a state of sustainable yield can be achieved by means of the proportional rule without harming any of the countries involved. Next we propose the population monotonic allocation scheme as management rule for the second problem: the division of profits within an
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society in its series 2006 Conference, August 24-25, 2006, Nelson, New Zealand with number 31964.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Fishery management; proportional rule; population monotonic allocation scheme; Shapley value; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C71; C72; D62; D74; Q22;
Other versions of this item:
- Do, Kim Hang Pham & Folmer, Henk & Norde, Henk, 2006. "Fishery Management Games: How to reduce effort and admit new members," 2006 Conference, August 24-25, 2006, Nelson, New Zealand 31964, New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
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Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-89249, Tilburg University.
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