IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/huaewp/232682.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Prices vs. Quantities: The Political Perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Finkelshtain, Israel
  • Kislev, Yoav

Abstract

Regulation regimes subject to influence of interest groups are compared. It is shown that allocation of the regulated commodity varies with the implemented control and that the advantage of prices (vs. quotas) increases with the elasticity of the demand or the supply of the commodity and decreases with the number of organized producers in the regulated industry. Control regimes can be ranked for negative, but not for positive, externalities. An optimal policy combination, mixing prices and quotas, is identified and limitation on its application are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Finkelshtain, Israel & Kislev, Yoav, 1995. "Prices vs. Quantities: The Political Perspective," Working Papers 232682, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Agricultural Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:huaewp:232682
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.232682
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/232682/files/hebrewuniv-workingpapers-9508.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.232682?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin L. Weitzman, 1974. "Prices vs. Quantities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(4), pages 477-491.
    2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    3. Zusman, Pinhas & Rausser, Gordon C., 1994. "Intraorganizational influence relations and the optimality of collective action," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 1-17, June.
    4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    5. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
    6. Zusman, Pinhas, 1976. "The Incorporation and Measurement of Social Power in Economic Models," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 17(2), pages 447-462, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Finkelshtain, Israel & Kislev, Yoav, 1996. "Economic Regulation and Political Influence," Working Papers 232692, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Agricultural Economic Research.
    2. Finkelshtain, Israel & Kislev, Yoav, 1997. "Prices versus Quantities: The Political Perspective," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 83-100, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Finkelshtain, Israel & Kislev, Yoav, 1996. "Political Lobbying, Individual Rationality, and Asymmetry of Taxes and Subsidies," Working Papers 232801, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Agricultural Economic Research.
    2. Finkelshtain, Israel & Kislev, Yoav, 1997. "Prices versus Quantities: The Political Perspective," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 83-100, February.
    3. Finkelshtain, Israel & Kislev, Yoav, 1996. "Economic Regulation and Political Influence," Working Papers 232692, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Agricultural Economic Research.
    4. Stavins, Robert, 2004. "Introduction to the Political Economy of Environmental Regulations," RFF Working Paper Series dp-04-12, Resources for the Future.
    5. Dapeng Cai & Jie Li, 2020. "Pollution for Sale: Firms’ Characteristics and Lobbying Outcome," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 77(3), pages 539-564, November.
    6. Bar-Nahum, Ziv & Reznik, Ami & Finkelshtain, Israel & Kan, Iddo, 2022. "Centralized water management under lobbying: Economic analysis of desalination in Israel," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    7. Hochman, Gal & Zilberman, David, 2021. "Optimal environmental taxation in response to an environmentally-unfriendly political challenger," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    8. Finkelshtain, Israel & Kislev, Yoav, 2004. "Taxes and subsidies in a polluting and politically powerful industry," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 481-492, June.
    9. Doron Nisani, 2018. "Efficient indirect regulation under Protection for Sale," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 41-52, August.
    10. Bullock, David S., 2012. "Dangers of Using Political Preference Functions in Political Economy Analysis: Examples from U.S. Ethanol Policy," 2012 First Congress, June 4-5, 2012, Trento, Italy 124118, Italian Association of Agricultural and Applied Economics (AIEAA).
    11. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    12. Pravin Krishna & Devashish Mitra, 2016. "Reciprocated unilateralism in trade policy," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 3, pages 37-63, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    13. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 667-690, September.
    14. Scott Gehlbach & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2010. "Businessman Candidates," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 718-736, July.
    15. John Morgan & Felix Várdy, 2011. "On the buyability of voting bodies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(2), pages 260-287, April.
    16. Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2004. "Vote Buying," Discussion Papers 1386, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
      • Jackson, Matthew O. & Dekel, Eddie & Wolinsky, Asher, 2005. "Vote buying," Working Papers 1215, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
      • Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2005. "Vote Buying," Others 0503006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra & Thierry Tressel, 2012. "A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 195-230.
    18. Tonis Alexander, 2002. "Privileges for Enterprises: Efficient Discrimination or Room for Abuse?," EERC Working Paper Series 02-01e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    19. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2006. "Informational lobbying and political contributions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 631-656, May.
    20. Gaoussou Diarra & Sébastien Marchand, 2011. "Environmental Compliance, Corruption and Governance: Theory and Evidence on Forest Stock in Developing Countries," Working Papers halshs-00557677, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Demand and Price Analysis;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:huaewp:232682. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/caehuil.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.