Tradable Permits Under Threat to Manage Nonpoint Source Pollution

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Tradable Permits Under Threat to Manage Nonpoint Source Pollution

Author Info

Ali, M.
Le Grusse, P.
Rio, P.

Abstract

In this article we treat the problem of nonpoint source pollution as a problem of moral hazard in group. To solve this kind of problem we consider a group performance based tax coupled to tradable permits market. The tax is activated if the group fails to meet the ambient standard. So the role of the tax is to provide an incitation to ensure that the agents provide the abatement level necessary to achieve the standard. The role of the tradable permits market is to distribute effectively this abatement level through the price of the permits which rises with the exchange of the permits.

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Paper provided by European Association of Agricultural Economists in its series 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium with number 44414.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ags:eaae08:44414

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2008-11-25 (All new papers)
NEP-ENV-2008-11-25 (Environmental Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Gregory L. Poe & William D. Schulze & Kathleen Segerson & Jordan F. Suter & Christian A. Vossler, 2004. "Exploring the Performance of Ambient-Based Policy Instruments When Nonpoint Source Polluters Can Cooperate," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1203-1210, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Segerson, Kathleen & Wu, JunJie, 2006. "Nonpoint pollution control: Inducing first-best outcomes through the use of threats," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 165-184, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Kathleen Segerson & JunJie Wu, 2003. "Nonpoint Pollution Control: Inducing First-best Outcomes through the Use of Threats," Working papers 2003-03, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004. [Downloadable!]
François Cochard & Marc Willinger & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2005. "Efficiency of Nonpoint Source Pollution Instruments: An Experimental Study," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 30(4), pages 393-422, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Spraggon, John, 2004. "Testing ambient pollution instruments with heterogeneous agents," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 837-856, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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