Incentive compatibility and procedural invariance testing of the one-and-one-half-bound dichotomous choice elicitation method: distinguishing strategic behaviour from the anchoring heuristic
The contingent valuation method for estimating willingness to pay for public goods typically adopts a single referendum question format which is statistically inefficient. As an alternative, Cooper, Hanemann and Signorello (2002) propose the Â'one-and-one-half boundÂ' (OOHB) format allowing researchers to question respondents about both a lower and higher limit upon project costs, thereby securing substantial statistical efficiency gains. These bounds are presented prior to the elicitation of responses thereby avoiding the negative 'ÂsurpriseÂ' induced by an unanticipated second question. However, this approach conflicts with the Gibbard-Satterthwaite result that only a single referendum format question is incentive compatible. The OOHB method may therefore be liable to strategic behaviour or reliance upon the anchoring heuristic observed in other repeated response elicitation formats. In a first formal test of the method we show that it fails crucial tests of procedural invariance and induces strategic behaviour amongst responses.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA with number
21104.
Length: Date of creation: 2006 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea06:21104
Contact details of provider: Postal: 555 East Wells Street, Suite 1100, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202 Phone: (414) 918-3190 Fax: (414) 276-3349 Email: Web page: http://www.aaea.org More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (AgEcon Search).
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Did you know? All full texts are decentralized with the publishers, none reside on this server, thus making it possible to offer this service for free to all parties.