A Model of Incentive Compatibility under Moral Hazard in Livestock Disease Outbreak Response
AbstractThis paper uses a principal-agent model to examine incentive compatibility in the presence of information asymmetry between the government and individual producers. Prior models of livestock disease have not incorporated information asymmetry between livestock managers and social planners. By incorporating the asymmetry, we investigate the role of incentives in producer behavior that influences the duration and magnitude of a disease epidemic.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI with number 19200.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 555 East Wells Street, Suite 1100, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
Phone: (414) 918-3190
Fax: (414) 276-3349
Web page: http://www.aaea.org
More information through EDIRC
livestock disease; moral hazard; principal-agent model; Institutional and Behavioral Economics;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mahul, Olivier & Gohin, Alexandre, 1999. "Irreversible Decision Making in Contagious Animal Disease Control under Uncertainty: An Illustration Using FMD in Brittany," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 26(1), pages 39-58, March.
- Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000.
"The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
- Bicknell, Kathryn & Wilen, James E. & Howitt, Richard E., 1999. "Public policy and private incentives for livestock disease control," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 43(4), December.
- Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1979. "Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 231-259, April.
- Kuchler, Fred & Hamm, Shannon, 2000. "Animal disease incidence and indemnity eradication programs," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 299-308, April.
- Charles E. Hyde & James A. Vercammen, 1997. "Costly Yield Verification, Moral Hazard, And Crop Insurance Contract Form," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1-3), pages 393-407.
- Richard D. Horan & Christopher A. Wolf, 2005. "The Economics of Managing Infectious Wildlife Disease," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(3), pages 537-551.
- Jin, Yanhong H. & McCarl, Bruce A., 2006. "Animal Disease Related Pre-event Investment and Post-event Compensation: A Multi-agent Problem," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21216, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Hirsch, Bernhard & Nell, Martin, 2007. "Anreizkompatibilität von Entschädigungssystemen für Kosten und Verluste aus Tierseuchenausbrüchen in der Europäischen Union," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 21, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
- Oparinde, Adewale & Birol, Ekin, 2011. "Farm households' preference for cash-based compensation versus livelihood-enhancing programs: A choice experiment to inform avian flu compensation policy in Nigeria," IFPRI discussion papers 1072, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.