Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Anreizkompatibilität von Entschädigungssystemen für Kosten und Verluste aus Tierseuchenausbrüchen in der Europäischen Union


Author Info

  • Hirsch, Bernhard
  • Nell, Martin
Registered author(s):


    Der Beitrag enthält eine anreiztheoretische Analyse der Versicherungssysteme, die zur Entschädigung von Kosten und Verlusten aus Tierseuchenausbrüchen in den EUMitgliedsländern eingerichtet sind. Es wird gezeigt, dass Kompensationszahlungen zur Erzielung effizienter Schadenverhütungsanreize prinzipiell notwendig sind. Die derzeitigen Regeln zur Finanzierung der Risikokosten und Kompensation von Schäden in der EU beinhalten jedoch Fehlanreize, die zu ineffizienten Produktionsstrukturen und zu geringen Schadenverhütungsanstrengungen von Tierhaltern führen. Darauf aufbauend werden Grundprinzipien für den institutionellen Aufbau und die Finanzierungs- und Kompensationsregeln anreizkompatibler Entschädigungssysteme entwickelt. -- This article focuses on analysing the incentive compatibility of existing compensation schemes in the member states of the EU indemnifying costs and losses of animal disease outbreaks. It is shown that efficient animal disease risk management basically requires compensation of costs and losses. The financing and indemnification principles of the compensation systems in the European Union however provide adverse incentives and result in inefficient livestock production structures and insufficient loss prevention activities of livestock holders. Guidelines are provided for the institutional arrangement and the financing and indemnification policy of compensation systems that allow for efficient animal disease risk management.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance in its series Working Papers on Risk and Insurance with number 21.

    as in new window
    Date of creation: 2007
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:zbw:hzvwps:21

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page:
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Tierseuchen; Risikomanagement; Externalitäten; moralisches Risiko; Animal diseases; risk management; externalities; moral hazard;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:


    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Gramig, Benjamin M. & Horan, Richard D. & Wolf, Christopher A., 2005. "A Model of Incentive Compatibility under Moral Hazard in Livestock Disease Outbreak Response," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19200, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    2. Meuwissen, Miranda P. M. & Van Asseldonk, Marcel A. P. M. & Huirne, Ruud B. M., 2003. "Alternative risk financing instruments for swine epidemics," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 75(2-3), pages 305-322.
    3. Hofmann, Annette, 2005. "Internalizing externalities of loss-prevention through insurance monopoly: An analysis of interdependent risks," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 16, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)



    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


    Access and download statistics


    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:hzvwps:21. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.