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Behavioral Incentives, Equilibrium Endemic Disease, and Health Management Policy for Farmed Animals

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We develop a dynamic capital valuation model in which each farm can take an action with farm-varying cost to increase the probability of not contracting a disease. In the presence of infection externalities, circumstances are identified under which multiple equilibria exist and where the one involving the most extensive set of action takers is socially optimal. It is suggested that costly capital markets are one factor in determining the extent of endemic disease in a region. The introduction of frictions, such as dealing with a cumbersome veterinary public health bureaucracy, can enhance social welfare by encouraging precautionary biosecurity actions. Some technical innovations can reduce social welfare. The model is also extended to study a voluntary herd depopulation scheme. Moral hazard in the biosecurity action will dampen the scheme's welfare effect.

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Paper provided by Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University in its series Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications with number 05-wp418.

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Date of creation: Dec 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ias:cpaper:05-wp418

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Keywords: biosecurity; continuous time; multiple equilibria; Nash behavior; reinfection.;

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  1. Nancy H. Chau & Harry de Gorter, 2005. "Disentangling the Consequences of Direct Payment Schemes in Agriculture on Fixed Costs, Exit Decisions, and Output," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(5), pages 1174-1181.
  2. David A. Hennessy & Jutta Roosen & Helen H. Jensen, 2004. "Infectious Disease, Productivity, and Scale in Open and Closed Animal Production Systems," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 04-wp367, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
  3. Chi, Junwook & Weersink, Alfons & Vanleeuwen, John A. & Keefe, Gregory P., 2001. "The Economics Of Controlling Infectious Diseases On Dairy Farms," Working Papers 34119, University of Guelph, Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics.
  4. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1994. "Comparing Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 441-59, June.
  5. Enrico Moretti & Jeffrey M. Perloff, 2002. "Efficiency Wages, Deferred Payments, and Direct Incentives in Agriculture," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 84(4), pages 1144-1155.
  6. Kremer, Michael, 1996. "Integrating Behavioral Choice into Epidemiological Models of AIDS," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(2), pages 549-73, May.
  7. Mahul, Olivier & Gohin, Alexandre, 1999. "Irreversible Decision Making in Contagious Animal Disease Control under Uncertainty: An Illustration Using FMD in Brittany," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 26(1), pages 39-58, March.
  8. Richard Bennett, 2003. "The 'Direct Costs'of Livestock Disease: The Development of a System of Models for the Analysis of 30 Endemic Livestock Diseases in Great Britain," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(1), pages 55-71.
  9. Geoffard, P.Y. & Philipson, T., 1995. "Rational Epidemics and their Public Control," DELTA Working Papers 95-15, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  10. Geoffard, Pierre-Yves & Philipson, Tomas, 1997. "Disease Eradication: Private versus Public Vaccination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 222-30, March.
  11. Bicknell, Kathryn & Wilen, James E. & Howitt, Richard E., 1999. "Public policy and private incentives for livestock disease control," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 43(4), December.
  12. Miles S. Kimball, 1989. "Labor Market Dynamics When Unemployment Is A Worker Discipline Device," NBER Working Papers 2967, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Richard D. Horan & Christopher A. Wolf, 2005. "The Economics of Managing Infectious Wildlife Disease," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(3), pages 537-551.
  14. David A. Hennessy, 2005. "Biosecurity and Infectious Animal Disease," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 05-wp413, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
  15. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
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Cited by:
  1. David A. Hennessy, 2013. "Biosecurity Externalities and Indemnities for Infectious Animal Diseases," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 13-wp539, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
  2. Tong Wang & Seong Cheol Park, 2014. "Livestock Disease Indemnity Design under Common Uncertainty: A Multi-agent Problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(3), pages 1396-1409.
  3. Gramig, Benjamin M. & Horan, Richard D. & Wolf, Christopher A., 2008. "Livestock Disease Indemnity Design When Moral Hazard is Followed by Adverse Selection," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6542, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  4. Xie, Fang & Horan, Richard D., 2008. "Disease and Behavioral Dynamics for Brucellosis in Elk and Cattle in the Greater Yellowstone Area," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6404, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  5. Xie, Fang & Horan, Richard D., 2009. "Disease and Behavioral Dynamics for Brucellosis Control in Elk and Cattle in the Greater Yellowstone Area," 2009 Conference, August 16-22, 2009, Beijing, China 51707, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
  6. David A. Hennessy & Tong Wang, 2013. "Strategic Interactions Among Private and Public Efforts when Preventing and Stamping Out an Highly Infectious Animal Disease," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 13-wp541, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.

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