The Effect of Market Structure on Pest Resistance Buildup
AbstractIn this paper we present a continuous time optimal control analysis of resistance buildup in agricultural chemicals when the supplier is a monopolist. We compare the monopolistic, competitive and socially optimal solutions after establishing the stability of each equilibrium. The central finding is that with a monopolistic supplier, resistance buildup is lower than socially optimal. This directly opposes the standard result in the resistance literature. This implies that policies to manage resistance should vary with the age of the chemical, with no intervention during the lifetime of a patent and an optimal tax once the patent expires.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO with number 20273.
Date of creation: 2004
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- Regev, Uri & Shalit, Haim & Gutierrez, A. P., 1983. "On the optimal allocation of pesticides with increasing resistance: The case of alfalfa weevil," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 86-100, March.
- Yerokhin, Oleg & Moschini, GianCarlo, 2007.
"Intellectual Property Rights and Crop-Improving R&D Under Adaptive Destruction,"
Staff General Research Papers
12825, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Oleg Yerokhin & GianCarlo Moschini, 2008. "Intellectual Property Rights and Crop-Improving R&D under Adaptive Destruction," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(1), pages 53-72, May.
- Oleg Yerokhin & GianCarlo Moschini, 2007. "Intellectual Property Rights and Crop-Improving R&D under Adaptive Destruction," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 07-wp449, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
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