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Environmental Quality Incentives Program: Why Are So Many Contracts Being Cancelled?

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  • Cattaneo, Andrea

Abstract

This paper analyzes why USDA's Environmental Quality Incentives Program has a high rate of contract withdrawals. Using a logit model we examine whether withdrawals are linked to: (i)farmers bidding for payments that are too low, (ii)a learning phase about the program, (iii)the types of conservation practices included in a contract.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL with number 20597.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea01:20597

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Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policy;

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  1. Cooper, Joseph C. & Keim, Russ, 1996. "Incentive payments to encourage farmer adoption of water quality protection practices," MPRA Paper 24779, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Amemiya, Takeshi, 1981. "Qualitative Response Models: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 1483-1536, December.
  3. Shoemaker, Robbin & Malik, Arun, 1993. "Optimal Cost-Sharing Programs to Reduce Agricultural Pollution," Technical Bulletins 157045, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
  4. Robert N. Stavins, 1998. "What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 69-88, Summer.
  5. Runar Brännlund & Yangho Chung & Rolf Färe & Shawna Grosskopf, 1998. "Emissions Trading and Profitability: The Swedish Pulp and Paper Industry," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(3), pages 345-356, October.
  6. Johnsen, Fred H, 1993. "Economic Analyses of Measures to Control Phosphorus Run-Off from Non-point Agricultural," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 20(4), pages 399-418.
  7. Reimund Schwarze & Peter Zapfel, 2000. "Sulfur Allowance Trading and the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market: A Comparative Design Analysis of two Major Cap-and-Trade Permit Programs?," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 17(3), pages 279-298, November.
  8. Richard Schmalensee & Paul L. Joskow & A. Denny Ellerman & Juan Pablo Montero & Elizabeth M. Bailey, 1998. "An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 53-68, Summer.
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Cited by:
  1. Khanna, Madhu & Isik, Murat & Zilberman, David, 2002. "Cost-effectiveness of alternative green payment policies for conservation technology adoption with heterogeneous land quality," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 157-174, August.

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