Voting on income-contingent loans for higher education
Abstract
We consider risk-averse individuals who differ in two characteristics - ability to benefit from education and inherited wealth - and analyze higher education participation under two alternative financing schemes - tax subsidy and (risk-sharing) income-contingent loans. With decreasing absolute risk aversion, wealthier individuals are more likely to undertake higher education despite the fact that, according to the stylized financing schemes we consider, individuals do not pay any up-front financial cost of education. We then determine which financing scheme arises when individuals are allowed to vote between schemes. We show that the degree of risk aversion plays a crucial role in determining which financing scheme obtains a majority, and that the composition of the support group for each financing scheme can be of two different types.Download Info
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Paper provided by Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics in its series ANUCBE School of Economics Working Papers with number 2011-549.
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Length: 26 Pages
Date of creation: Jul 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2011-549
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Keywords:Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
- I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-EDU-2011-08-09 (Education)
- NEP-LAB-2011-08-09 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-POL-2011-08-09 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2011-08-09 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jordi Jofre-Monseny & Martin Wimbersky, 2010.
"Political economics of higher education finance,"
Working Papers
2010/17, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Rainald Borck & Martin Wimbersky, 2009. "Political Economics of Higher Education Finance," CESifo Working Paper Series 2829, CESifo Group Munich.
- Dan Anderberg & Alessandro Balestrino, 2008. "The Political Economy of Post-Compulsory Education Policy with Endogenous Credit Constraints," CESifo Working Paper Series 2304, CESifo Group Munich.
- Del Rey, Elena & Racionero, MarĂa, 2010.
"Financing schemes for higher education,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 104-113, March.
- Maria Racionero & Elena Del Rey, 2006. "Financing schemes for higher education," ANUCBE School of Economics Working Papers 2006-460, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Garcia-Penalosa, Cecilia & Walde, Klaus, 2000. "Efficiency and Equity Effects of Subsidies to Higher Education," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 702-22, October.
- Bruce Chapman, 2005.
"Income Contingent Loans for Higher Education: International Reform,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
491, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
- Chapman, Bruce, 2006. "Income Contingent Loans for Higher Education: International Reforms," Handbook of the Economics of Education, Elsevier.
- De Fraja, Gianni, 2001. "Education Policies: Equity, Efficiency and Voting Equilibrium," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(471), pages C104-19, May.
Citations
Blog mentions
As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:- Are income-contingent loans for higher education feasible?
by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-09-01 14:21:00
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