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Financing schemes for higher education

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  • Maria Racionero

    ()

  • Elena Del Rey

    ()

Abstract

Most industrial countries have traditionally subsidized the provision of higher education. Several alternative financing schemes, which rely on larger contributions from students, are being increasingly adopted. Schemes such as income contingent loans, like the Australian Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), provide insurance against uncertain educational outcomes. This paper analyses alternative financing schemes for higher education, with particular emphasis on the insurance role and its effect on higher education participation.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics in its series ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics with number 2006-460.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2006-460

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References

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  1. Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, 2009. "Scholarships or Student Loans? Subsidizing Higher Education in the Presence of Moral Hazard," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 55-87, 02.
  2. Dionne, G. & Eeckhoudt, L., 1984. "Self-Insurance, Self-Protection and Increased Risk Aversion," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 8424, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  3. Nerlove, Marc L, 1975. "Some Problems in the Use of Income-contingent Loans for the Finance of Higher Education," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(1), pages 157-83, February.
  4. Bruce Chapman, 2005. "Income Contingent Loans for Higher Education: International Reform," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University 491, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
  5. Bruce Chapman & Andrew Leigh, 2009. "Do Very High Tax Rates Induce Bunching? Implications for the Design of Income Contingent Loan Schemes," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 85(270), pages 276-289, 09.
  6. Del Rey, Elena & Racionero, María, 2010. "Financing schemes for higher education," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 104-113, March.
  7. Bas Jacobs & Frederick van der Ploeg, 2006. "Guide to reform of higher education: a European perspective," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 21(47), pages 535-592, 07.
  8. Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-48, July-Aug..
  9. Garcia-Penalosa, Cecilia & Walde, Klaus, 2000. "Efficiency and Equity Effects of Subsidies to Higher Education," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 702-22, October.
  10. Barr, Nicholas, 2001. "The Welfare State as Piggy Bank: Information, Risk, Uncertainty, and the Role of the State," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780199246595, October.
  11. Nicholas Barr & Iain Crawford, 1998. "Funding Higher Education in an Age of Expansion," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(1), pages 45-70.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Rainald Borck & Silke Uebelmesser & Martin Wimbersky, 2012. "The Political Economics of Higher Education Finance for Mobile Individuals," CESifo Working Paper Series 3877, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. DEL REY, Elena & RACIONERO, Maria, . "Financing schemes for higher education," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -2181, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Elena Del Rey & María Racionero, 2012. "Voting On Income‐Contingent Loans For Higher Education," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 88(s1), pages 38-50, 06.
  4. Rainald Borck & Martin Wimbersky, 2009. "Political Economics of Higher Education Finance," CESifo Working Paper Series 2829, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Elena Del Rey & María Racionero, 2014. "Choosing the type of income-contingent loan: risk-sharing versus risk-pooling," Working Papers 2014/7, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  6. Rosemary Walker & Liviu Florea, 2014. "Easy-Come-Easy-Go: Moral Hazard in the Context of Return to Education," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, Springer, vol. 120(2), pages 201-217, March.
  7. Joan Rosselló, 2007. "Does a public university system avoid the stratification of public universities and the segregation of students?," DEA Working Papers, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada 26, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada.
  8. Robert J. Gary-Bobo & Alain Trannoy, 2014. "Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Working Papers halshs-00993124, HAL.
  9. Alexander Kemnitz, 2007. "University Funding Reform, Competition, and Teaching Quality," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(2), pages 356-378, June.
  10. Alain Trannoy & Robert Gary-Bobo, 2014. "Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," AMSE Working Papers 1416, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France, revised 02 Apr 2014.

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