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Sex, Money and Corruption

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Author Info
José A. Rodrigues-Neto ()

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Abstract

This paper investigates the consequences of receiving sexual favors or other services as an alternative form of bribery. It infers how these non-monetary payments are made by analyzing the relative effciency of sex bribes and the bargaining power of agents. By assumption, sex payments are less e¢ cient and harder to detect monetary payments. If the Receiver has a sufficiently high (low) utility for consuming sex, then only sex (money) bribes are feasible. In intermediate cases, sexual bribery is offered if and only if the relative bargaining power of the Receiver is sufficiently small compared to that of the Corruptor.

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Paper provided by Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics in its series ANUCBE School of Economics Working Papers with number 2009-500.

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Length: 32 Pages
Date of creation: Jan 2009
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Handle: RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2009-500

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K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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  1. Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Isaac Ehrlich & Francis T. Lui, 1999. "Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages S270-S293, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2006. "Corruption and auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 97-108, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 145-59, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Polinsky, A. Mitchell, 2006. "Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 323-335, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Waldfogel, Joel, 1993. "The Deadweight Loss of Christmas," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1328-36, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Barreto, Raul A., 2000. "Endogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 35-60, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2001. "Corruption and optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Hauk, Esther & Saez-Marti, Maria, 2002. "On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 311-335, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "Local Corruption and Global Capital Flows," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 31(2000-2), pages 303-354. [Downloadable!]
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