Sex, Money and Corruption
AbstractThis paper investigates the consequences of receiving sexual favors or other services as an alternative form of bribery. It infers how these non-monetary payments are made by analyzing the relative effciency of sex bribes and the bargaining power of agents. By assumption, sex payments are less e¢ cient and harder to detect monetary payments. If the Receiver has a sufficiently high (low) utility for consuming sex, then only sex (money) bribes are feasible. In intermediate cases, sexual bribery is offered if and only if the relative bargaining power of the Receiver is sufficiently small compared to that of the Corruptor.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics in its series ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics with number 2009-500.
Length: 32 Pages
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
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