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Corruption, Optimal Taxation, and Growth

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  • Raul A. Barreto
  • James Alm

Abstract

How does the presence of corruption affect the optimal mix between consumption and income taxation? In this article, the authors examine this issue using a simple neoclassical growth model, with a self-seeking and corrupt public sector. They find that the optimal tax mix in a corrupt economy is one that relies more heavily on consumption taxes than on income taxes, relative to an economy without corruption. Their model also allows them to investigate the effect of corruption on the optimal (or welfare-maximizing) size of government, and their results indicate that the optimal size of government balances the wishes of the corrupt public sector for a larger government, and so greater opportunities for corruption, with those in the private sector who prefer a smaller government. Not surprisingly, the optimal size of government is smaller in an economy with corruption than in one without corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Raul A. Barreto & James Alm, 2003. "Corruption, Optimal Taxation, and Growth," Public Finance Review, , vol. 31(3), pages 207-240, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:31:y:2003:i:3:p:207-240
    DOI: 10.1177/1091142103031003001
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    Cited by:

    1. Mawani, Amin & Trivedi, Viswanath Umashanker, 2021. "Collusive vs. coercively corrupt tax auditors and their impact on tax compliance," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C).
    2. Anastasia Litina & Theodore Palivos, 2015. "Corruption and Tax Evasion: Reflections on Greek Tragedy," Working Papers 193, Bank of Greece.
    3. Rodrigues-Neto, José A., 2014. "On corruption, bribes and the exchange of favors," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 152-162.
    4. Anum Ellahi, 2020. "Corruption, Tax Evasion, and Economic Development in Economies with Decentralised Tax Administrative System," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 59(3), pages 419-438.
    5. Nicholas Apergis & Dan Constantin Dănuleţiu, 2013. "Public deficit, public debt, corruption and economic freedom: some empirical evidence from Romania," Romanian Economic Journal, Department of International Business and Economics from the Academy of Economic Studies Bucharest, vol. 16(48), pages 3-22, June.
    6. Květa Kubátová, 2009. "Optimal Taxation - Review of Theory [Optimální zdanění - přehled dosavadní teorie]," Český finanční a účetní časopis, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2009(3), pages 24-36.
    7. Litina, Anastasia & Palivos, Theodore, 2016. "Corruption, tax evasion and social values," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 164-177.
    8. Yongzheng Liu & Haibo Feng, 2015. "Tax structure and corruption: cross-country evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(1), pages 57-78, January.
    9. Halkos, George E. & Papageorgiou, George J. & Halkos, Emmanuel G. & Papageorgiou, John G., 2020. "Public debt games with corruption and tax evasion," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 250-261.
    10. Kammas, Pantelis & Litina, Anastasia & Palivos, Theodore, 2013. "The Quality of Public Education in Unequal Societies: The Role of Tax Institutions," MPRA Paper 52193, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Alm, James & Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge & McClellan, Chandler, 2016. "Corruption and firm tax evasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 146-163.
    12. A. Enisan Akinlo, 2024. "Corruption and Misery Index in Nigeria: Is There a Link?," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , vol. 36(1), pages 26-40, January.
    13. Dzhumashev, Ratbek, 2008. "Corruption and regulatory burden," MPRA Paper 2081, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Shuanglin Lin & Wei Zhang, 2009. "The effect of corruption on capital accumulation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 97(1), pages 67-93, May.
    15. Joseph G. ATTILA, 2008. "Corruption, taxation and economic growth: theory and evidence," Working Papers 200829, CERDI.
    16. Jos� A. Rodrigues-Neto, 2009. "Sex, Money and Corruption," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2009-500, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    17. Vita, Giuseppe Di, 2021. "Political corruption and legislative complexity: Two sides of same coin?," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 136-147.
    18. Roy Cerqueti & Raffaella Coppier, 2015. "Corruptibility and tax evasion," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 355-373, April.
    19. Matheus Pereira & Wilson Cruz Vieira, 2010. "Corruption in a neoclassical growth model with a non-convex production function," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 57(3), pages 335-346, September.
    20. Idrys Fransmel Okombi, 2021. "Taxation et croissance économique en Afrique: la qualité des institutions importe‐t‐elle?," African Development Review, African Development Bank, vol. 33(4), pages 592-606, December.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General

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